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Abstract 
 
Despite their apparent interest, private investors are surprisingly disengaged from sustainable 
investing, an observation that has received limited scholarly attention. This theory building study 
draws on the theory of planned behaviour to conceptualize the decision-making process of 
private investors towards sustainable investing. Findings from literature provide some insights 
but do not yield a comprehensive answer as to why private investors refrain from sustainable 
investing. Interviews with wealthy private investors led us to identify a generally high interest in 
sustainable investing and dominant barriers that prevent actual engagement. Barriers are the 
perception of high volatility within sustainable investments in combination with, first, a short 
investment time horizon and, second, recent financial losses. Third, we find that investment 
advisors withhold required information from their clients. We suggest a decision-making 
framework that facilitates a better understanding of the engagement of private investors in 
sustainable investing, and outline avenues for future research and implications for practitioners. 
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Introduction 
Academic- and practitioner-oriented literature has paid significant attention to the incorporation 
of sustainability criteria into capital market investment decisions, or sustainable investing (SI; 
Global Sustainable Investment Alliance [GSIA], 2013). The amount of assets and the number of 
market participants engaged in SI has grown substantially worldwide, and accounts for 
approximately USD 14 trillion in investments (GSIA, 2013) and over 1,100 institutions 
committed to SI to date (United Nations Principles of Responsible Investing, 2013). However, in 
Europe, the region where SI is most prominent, institutional investors, such as pension funds, 
govern 97% of the total assets under management in SI while only 3% are held by private 
investors (Eurosif, 2012a; GSIA, 2013). Therefore, we disagree with claims that SI is a 
mainstream practice widely applied in capital markets (e.g., Eurosif, 2012a; Sievänen, Rita, & 
Scholtens, 2013). While this claim may hold true for institutional investors, it does not for 
private investors. For private investors there seems to be a dichotomy between interest in SI and 
actual engagement in SI. Empirical evidence shows that the majority of people, including 
wealthy private investors, are potentially interested in SI (Eurosif, 2012b; Gallup, 2009; Wins & 
Zwergel, 2014). However, surveys find that the SI-market potential amongst private investors is 
far from being realized (Schrader, 2006) as they face barriers that limit their engagement in SI. 
The observed asymmetry between the engagement in SI by institutional and private investors 
cannot be explained by the distribution of assets either, as institutions govern an estimated USD 
80 trillion compared to USD 50 trillion in private financial wealth (Çelik & Isaksson, 2014; 
Shorrocks, Davies, & Lluberas, 2013). In light of this “SI gap” – the gap between expected and 
actual engagement of private investors in SI – this study is motivated by the question, “What are 
the barriers that limit the engagement of private investors in SI?” 
This study is a theory-building effort that aims to understand the reasoning behind the SI 
gap. It also provides answers to specific calls for research: As SI is still an emerging field, 
research on decision-making processes at the micro-level of SI adoption is required (Gond, 
Louche, Slager, Juravle, & Yamahaki, 2011; Juravle & Lewis, 2008), especially on barriers 
(Glac, 2008) and wealthy private investors (Schrader, 2006). This paper develops a decision-
making framework based on the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen & Madden, 1986; Ajzen, 
1991). This theory has proven useful to explain variations in individual behaviour in regard to, 
for example, environmental cognition (Henry & Dietz, 2012), sustainable behaviour in the 
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business sphere (Lulfs & Hahn, 2014), or equity investments (East, 1993). By applying the 
extant SI literature to the framework we show that some answers are given but explanations for 
the SI gap remain limited. In our empirical work, we conducted interviews with wealthy private 
investors that have more than one million USD in freely investable assets; a very small, secretive 
segment that governs 40% of total household wealth (Shorrocks et al., 2013). Our analysis points 
to a high interest in SI and three dominant barriers. Two barriers pertain to the perception of the 
volatility of SI. Investors who perceive SI as overly volatile were unlikely to engage in SI when 
they had a short investment time horizon or when they had experienced prior general losses. The 
third barrier relates to investment advisors that withhold SI information. Through the application 
of our exploratory empirical data we develop a framework that allows for a more fine-grained 
understanding of the decision-making process of private investors in the SI context. 
The next section provides a background on sustainable investing, followed by the 
conceptual decision-making framework used in this study and the application of SI literature to 
it. Further sections outline the empirical method applied and present the interview results along 
the structure of the framework. We close with a discussion and conclusion. 
 
Background: Sustainable Investing 
The general understanding of what sustainable investing (SI) entails is to “integrate certain kinds 
of non-financial concerns – variously called ethical, social, environmental or corporate 
governance criteria – in the otherwise strictly financials-driven investment process” (Sandberg, 
Juravle, Hedesström, & Hamilton, 2008, p. 519). This can be achieved through a focus on certain 
industries (e.g., renewable energy), and likewise their exclusion (e.g., weapons, tobacco), or by 
the integration of environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) criteria into investment 
decisions. The advantage of our broad definition of SI beyond the ‘responsible’ or ‘ethical’ 
terminology is that it does not restrain the discussion to any narrow interpretation of SI. In 
practice, SI is a broad field of investment approaches. Most prominent are the application of 
exclusion criteria and the integration of ESG criteria in mainstream security selection. A much 
smaller tranche of assets is invested in more volatile industries or themes such as water or 
renewable energy, or in new asset classes such as microfinance (GSIA, 2013). 
The SI literature is focused on the financial performance of SI on the level of firms or 
mutual funds (Gond et al., 2011). On the level of SI mutual funds, the risk-adjusted performance 
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is found to be “not statistically different from the performance of conventional funds” 
(Renneboog, Ter Horst, & Zhang, 2008, p. 1). Also on the level of individual firms no negative 
performance implications are found (Albertini, 2013; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003; 
Surroca, Tribó, & Waddock, 2010). Beyond financial performance, literature on non-financial 
aspects of SI discusses a range of arguments for engaging in SI, from a ‘warm glow’, or positive 
feelings, to ethical concerns and social status (e.g., Andreoni, 1990; Dunfee, 2003; Statman, 
2004). 
Regarding the segment of private investors, some studies cover investor characteristics, 
motivations, and, to a lesser degree, barriers of SI-investors, as well as comparisons with non-SI 
investors (e.g., Cheah, Jamali, Johnson, & Sung, 2011; Nilsson, Nordvall, & Isberg, 2010; 
Nilsson, 2009; Sandberg et al., 2008; Sandberg & Nilsson, 2011). However, there is no clear 
answer to the SI-gap. It remains unclear why some individual investors practice SI while others 
do not (Glac, 2008). The literature does not provide a clear picture of what the dominant barriers 
are, if and how barriers and other aspects relate to each other, and what kind of combinations 
matter.  
Among private investors, particularly interesting are individuals with more than one 
million USD in freely investable assets, known as High Net Worth Individuals (HNWIs) 
(Eurosif, 2012b). HNWIs make up 0.7% of the world population, yet they govern more than 40% 
of global household wealth (Shorrocks et al., 2013), and thus can substantially contribute to more 
SI engagement. HNWIs appear to be interested in considering sustainability topics such as 
climate change in their investment decisions since they “are typically long-term investors whose 
aim is to preserve capital for the next generations to come” (Eurosif, 2012b, p. 7). Further, 
HNWIs are in a preferable situation to invest along their interests, since they “have access to 
investments that are normally closed to smaller retail investors, and the freedom to move funds 
quickly without having to perform the extensive due diligence required by institutional 
investors” (Eurosif, 2012b, p. 7). However, the observed SI gap persists, and although that 
puzzle lends itself to scholarly work, research into this group that is well-guarded by private 
banks and their advisors appears to be non-existent. Insights on HNWIs in the context of SI are 
therefore required (Schrader, 2006), which is where this study contributes with empirical work.  
In light of the observed gaps in literature we undertake a corresponding theory building 
effort. We draw from literature and our empirical work with HNWIs to develop a decision-
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making framework for private investors´ engagement in SI based on the theory of planned 
behaviour, including a perspective on dominant barriers. Next, we outline the initial framework. 
 
Theory of Planned Behaviour in the Context of Sustainable Investing 
To predict behaviour, scholars focus on frameworks to link evaluative criteria to the formation of 
an intention towards a specific behaviour, coupled with the factors that limit the realization of 
that behaviour (Kalafatis, Pollard, East, & Tsogas, 1999). Most prevalent among these 
frameworks is the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen & Madden, 1986; Ajzen, 1991). Theory of 
planned behaviour (TPB) has been found to provide high explanatory power and is useful in 
understanding a wide range of individual behaviours (Ajzen, 2014). In regard to sustainability, 
TPB is applied to understand the determinants of individual behaviour in the context of, for 
example, pollution reduction preferences (Cordano & Frieze, 2000), sustainable behaviour in the 
corporate sphere (Lulfs & Hahn, 2014), unethical behaviour (Chang, 1998), green marketing 
(Kalafatis et al., 1999), recycling (Ramayah, Lee, & Lim, 2012), water saving technology (Lynne 
& Casey, 1995) and environmental attitude (Kaiser, Wölfing, & Fuhrer, 1999). These studies 
demonstrate the suitability of TPB to explain and predict the variance in the behaviour of 
individuals in activities related to sustainability. However, they also show that different factors 
matter to understand behaviour in different contexts. In regard to the application of TPB in the 
general context of investment decisions – i.e., without a specific link to sustainability – East 
(1993) discusses the role of relatives and friends, easy access to funds, expected financial profit 
and the risk of the investment. Also in the investment context, Maula et al (2005) shows that 
whether individuals invest in new businesses owned by others is influenced by the personal 
familiarity with entrepreneurs, status as an owner-manager in a firm, perceived skills in starting a 
new business, and gender. We are not aware of an application of TPB to SI. In TPB, behaviour is 
predicted by intention, which is predicted by three determinants - attitude towards the behaviour, 
subjective norm and perceived behavioural control. We relate these determinants of behaviour of 
the TPB framework to SI, with the result shown in Figure 1. 
Attitude towards the behaviour refers to the attributes, outcomes and consequences that 
are associated with the behaviour, i.e. if the behaviour is deemed attractive or not. For example, 
an individual might associate the behaviour of eating a chocolate cake with a great sweet taste 
and feeling satisfied, but also with calories and feeling guilty for becoming fat. Whichever 
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association weighs more strongly will determine if attitude towards the behaviour is positive or 
negative. In investment decisions, associations that matter for the formation of a positive attitude 
are, for example, high financial profits and low volatility (East, 1993). In regard to SI, several 
studies point to financial performance, risk, and non-financial factors as important to investors 
(Beal & Goyen, 1998; Bollen, 2007; Chatterji, Levine, & Toffel, 2009; Eurosif, 2012b;  Nilsson, 
2009; Rosen, Sandler, & Shani, 1991; Statman, 2004). Thus, we expect that high financial profits 
and investment security or low volatility are supportive factors in the decision-making process in 
the SI context. Since SI also covers non-financial factors such as ethical considerations and 
personal values, we infer along the findings of the psychologist Festinger (1957) that investors 
will seek to align their beliefs with their investments. Thus, investors evaluate those 
opportunities that align with their values more positively. As literature points to a neutral 
risk/return implication of SI, and SI should be positioned positively in regard to non-financial 
considerations, we expect a positive attitude towards the behaviour in SI. 
Subjective norm, the second predictor of intention, refers to the social pressure that the 
individual perceives towards the behaviour. Subjective norm results from the perception of what 
important peers or groups think about the behaviour, and the motivation to comply with these 
views. Eating a chocolate cake might be approved of by a person’s office colleagues, but 
frowned upon by his marathon-running manager. As for investment decisions, East (1993) shows 
that the intention of a person to invest in shares is significantly influenced by the opinion of rela-
tives and friends. Surveys find that the majority of Europeans consider sustainability impor-tant 
(Gallup, 2009); a representative study for Germany indicates that more than half of the citizens 
are generally interested in SI (Wins & Zwergel, 2014). Also wealthy private investors appear 
interested in SI (Eurosif, 2012b). Thus, we expect that there is some sort of perceived public 
pressure to invest in SI, and this subjective norm is supportive towards the intention to invest. 
Perceived behavioural control, the last predictor of intention, is the perceived ease or 
difficulty to actually implement the behaviour of interest. That includes the person’s perception 
of resources that are required, such as sufficient information, as well as opportunities or 
challenges to implement the behaviour. Consider that the bakers in the entire neighbourhood are 
perceived incapable of making proper cake. A supportive attitude towards the behaviour and 
subjective norm will result in a less strong intention to eat cake in such a situation compared to a 
situation where an artisan cake shop is found just down the street. In the investment context, East 
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(1993) finds that investors who feel that they can’t easily buy shares do not do so. Thus, we 
expect perceived behavioural control, the perception of sufficient information, opportunities, and 
low barriers, to impact private investors’ formation of the intention to invest in SI. 
In addition to its role as one of the three factors that determine intention formation, 
perceived behavioural control can also influence the behaviour in another way: A factor called 
actual behavioural control relates to perceived behavioural control, but pertains not to perceived 
barriers yet rather actual real-world barriers and opportunities that the person faces once the 
intention for a certain behaviour is formed. Such external aspects can hinder or facilitate the 
translation of that intention into action. As an example, consider the person who formed the 
intention to eat cake and went to the artisan cake shop down the street, but found it closed. East 
(1993) argues that investment decisions are so fact-based that no major difference between actual 
control and perceived control should exist. However, SI can be complex and new to some 
investors. Unanticipated regulatory barriers, advisors that are not accustomed to SI, or other 
roadblocks could limit people’s ability to move from intention to behaviour. Thus, we expect that 
also the last determinant of behaviour, actual behavioural control, matters in the SI context. 
In sum, we can relate each determinant of behaviour in the TPB framework to SI. We 
propose a correspondingly adapted wording of the framework as shown in Figure 1. As in other 
contexts related to sustainability, with this framework we expect to understand why individuals 
invest in SI, or why they do not invest, as observed in the SI gap, and to explain such variation.  
 
Figure 1: Theory of Planned Behaviour framework adapted to the context of sustainable 
investing 
Source: Adapted from Ajzen & Madden (1986) 
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Literature Related to the Determinants of Private Investors’ Behaviour in SI  
Depending on the balance of positive and negative connotations, three determinants of behaviour 
in the TPB framework either support or limit the formation of the intention to invest in SI. The 
intention leads to the behaviour of investing in SI, if no limitations from actual behavioural 
control constrain that. In our effort to develop a framework that helps to understand the decision-
making process of private investors in SI, we relate insights from the SI literature to positive and 
negative connotations of each determinant of behaviour. Since the observed SI gap indicates that 
barriers keep investors from investing in SI, we focus our review on barriers, which we define as 
“departures from rational thought in predictable directions” (Shu & Bazerman, 2010, p. 3). An 
overview of studies that pertain to barriers for private investors in SI is presented in Table 1. 
Further, Table 2 outlines studies on motivations, as well as our results of inferring barriers by 
negating the aspects that these studies identified as motivations for SI. 
In regard to attitude towards the behaviour, empirical work with private investors has 
identified the perception of a low financial performance or high risk of SI as a potential barrier 
(Eurosif, 2012b; Glac, 2008). Financial risk was recognized as a barrier in SI because it conflicts 
with the moral obligation to bequeath wealth to heirs (Lewis, 2001). In regard to non-financial 
aspects, the perception that SI products fail to comply with expectations on ethics, irresponsible 
business practices, or support for sustainable development could also be a barrier. Such aspects 
have been found to matter for private investors, sometimes more so than financial performance 
(Beal & Goyen, 1998; Lewis, 2002; Rosen et al., 1991; Webley, Lewis, & Mackenzie, 2001).  
Subjective norm relates to public pressure to invest in SI. It appears that the public 
including HNWIs are likely interested in SI (Eurosif, 2012b; Gallup, 2009; Wins & Zwergel, 
2014). Further, literature suggests that some investors engage in SI in the expectation of a 
preferable public image (Chatterji, Levine, & Toffel, 2009; Statman, 2004). Yet, the literature 
does not indicate potential barriers that could negatively influence this subjective norm.  
In perceived behavioural control, investors, in their thought process about the ease of 
investing in SI, can perceive a number of barriers related to the availability of SI products. One 
barrier could be a perceived mismatch between the focus of SI products on excluding industries 
and peoples’ own interests, since “investors seem to prefer to reward firms who display overall 
positive social behaviour rather than to exclude firms on the basis of certain products or 
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practices” (Berry & Junkus, 2013, p. 707). Nilsson (2008) points to the barrier of mistrust 
towards the marketed merits of SI products; thus investors could refrain from even looking for a 
suitable product. Similarly, a survey by Eurosif (2012b) amongst private and institutional 
investors identifies a perceived lack of SI-information and SI-products as barriers.  
As for actual behavioural control, the last determinant of behaviour, barriers have been 
found in the search for a suitable product. This search takes place after investors have formed the 
intention to invest in SI. Literature points to barriers in the form of a lack of financially relevant 
SI information published by listed companies (Hummels & Timmer, 2004), an overwhelming 
breadth of sustainability information offered by SI mutual funds (Nilsson, Siegl, & Korling, 
2012), or investment advisors that withhold SI information from private investors in retail 
banking (Schrader, 2006).   
Overall, a variety of potential barriers are identified in the literature that can be applied to 
the TPB framework. However, there are inconsistencies and knowledge gaps. In terms of 
inconsistencies, for example, concerns about moral obligation to bequeath to heirs, and therefore 
long-term performance concerns, are inconsistent with peoples’ extremely high discount rates 
regarding the future and a strong focus on short-term returns (Shu & Bazerman, 2010). Concern 
for sustainable development as an important aspect is challenged by the tendency of individuals 
to blame others instead of taking action themselves, overly high optimism for the development of 
the future and human’s ability to control uncontrollable events such as climate change, and 
mental reliance on future technology (Bazerman, Tenbrunsel, & Wade-Benzoni, 1998). 
More important, however, are the following knowledge gaps. Amid the breadth and 
quantity of proposed barriers, it remains inconclusive what the dominant barriers are, i.e. what 
aspects matter most, if interrelations and/or combinations amongst barriers or other aspects exist, 
and where in the decision-making process these barriers appear. 
The disparate findings and gaps of the extant literature reiterate the need for empirical 
work. This study applies insights from interviews with HNWIs to inform a framework that 
conceptualizes the decision-making process of private investors in the context of SI. This 
requires a more comprehensive and complete understanding of dominant barriers and the 
resulting SI-gap. The method applied in our empirical work is outlined in the following section. 
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Table 1: Studies Related to SI Barriers for Individual Private Investors 
Study Aim, research 
question(s) 
Methodology  Barrier(s) identified Comment 
Lewis 
(2001) 
What motivates 
ordinary, neutral and 
SI-investors to 
invest? 
Focus groups 
(94 private 
investors) 
Fear of low financial 
return of SI conflicts with 
moral obligation to 
bequeath; inertia 
Heirs as a barrier is 
contrary to Eurosif 
(2012b) (see Table 2) 
Hummels 
and 
Timmer 
(2004) 
Does ESG or ethical 
(SEE) reporting meet 
shareholders’ needs? 
Multi-case study 
(3 companies) 
Insufficient corporate 
SEE reporting for 
financially motivated 
investors 
“Insufficient 
information” as a barrier 
is contrary to Nilsson, 
Siegl and Korling (2012) 
Glac 
(2008) 
Why do some 
individual investors 
practice SI and others 
do not? 
Experimental 
survey (240 
students) 
Some investors might be 
less willing to sacrifice 
financial returns and 
associate these with SI  
No clear barrier 
identified but inferred; 
calls for further research 
on barriers 
Schrader 
(2006) 
What role do advisors 
at retail banks play as 
diffusion agents of 
ethical funds? 
Mystery 
shopping (21 
advisors) 
Retail advisors do not 
inform retail clients about 
ethical funds 
Limited to retail 
investors; calls for 
further research on other 
regions and wealthy 
investors  
Berry and 
Junkus 
(2013) 
What is the attitude 
and understanding of 
individual investors 
toward SI? 
Survey (5,000 
individual 
investors) 
Exclusionary SI 
approaches could 
mismatch investors’ 
interest in more holistic 
approaches 
Specific barrier inferred 
from survey results; 
contrary to Nilsson et al. 
(2012) 
Nilsson et 
al. (2012) 
How do consumers 
evaluate pro-socially 
positioned mutual 
funds in the post-
purchase stage? 
Literature 
review 
Overwhelming 
heterogeneity and varying 
quality of SI mutual fund 
data 
Specific barrier inferred 
from literature rather 
than by empirics; covers 
only the retail market  
Nilsson 
(2008)  
What is the impact of 
pro-social or financial 
performance, socio-
demographic factors 
on SI investors’ 
behaviour? 
SI customer data 
(528 private 
investors) 
Mistrust towards the 
various marketed merits 
of SI 
Specific barrier inferred 
from a non-SI study by 
Crane (2000) 
Eurosif 
(2012b) 
Practitioner study on 
the status of SI for 
HNWIs, family 
offices and banks  
Survey 
(undisclosed 
respondents) 
Lack of products; 
mistrust; lack of advice; 
financial performance 
and risk concerns 
Utility of sample is 
limited due to an 
undisclosed number, type 
and distribution of 
respondents  
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Table 2: Studies Related to SI Motivators for Individual Private Investors; Inferred SI-Barriers 
Study Aim, research 
question(s) 
Methodology SI motive(s) identified SI barrier(s) inferred 
Rosen et 
al. (1991) 
Identify 
characteristics of 
socially responsible 
investors, salient 
issues and 
expectations 
Survey (4,000 
individual investors 
of two funds that 
incorporate social 
screens) 
Avoid poor environmental 
and/or labour relations 
practices and achieve a 
satisfactory financial 
performance and way of 
life 
Poor ethical, labour 
relations, financial 
performance or fit with 
lifestyle  
Eurosif 
(2012b) 
Practitioner study on 
the status of SI for 
HNWIs, family 
offices, banks 
Survey 
(undisclosed 
number, type and 
distribution of 
respondents) 
Contribute to sustainable 
development, financial 
opportunity, wealth 
preservation  
Poor contribution to 
sustainable 
development or 
financial return; no 
heirs 
Bollen 
(2007) 
Does the behaviour 
of SI investors differ 
from the behaviour 
of investors in 
conventional funds? 
Regression on fund 
flows within SI 
funds versus 
conventional funds 
Utility from owning 
securities of companies 
consistent with personal 
values and societal 
concerns 
Products inconsistent 
with personal values or 
societal concerns 
Nilsson 
(2009) 
Identify reasons for 
investors to invest in 
SI-profiled mutual 
funds 
Cluster analysis of 
survey data (563 
individual 
investors) 
Positive financial 
performance, satisfy 
social responsibility aims 
Poor financial or social 
performance  
Beal & 
Goyen 
(1998) 
What are the 
motivations for 
investors to invest in 
a nature 
conservation firm? 
Survey (739 
individual 
shareholders of a 
nature conservation 
firm) 
Counter environmental 
concerns, positive 
financial performance  
Poor environmental 
contribution or 
financial performance 
Lewis 
(2001) 
What motivates 
ordinary, neutral and 
SI-investors to invest 
in SI? 
Focus groups (94 
private investors) 
Avoid investments in 
firms with unacceptable 
ethical or environmental 
practices 
Poor ethical or 
environmental 
performance of firms 
prevalent in SI 
products  
Statman 
(2004) 
Analogy from 
restaurants to 
financial products 
and investors 
Theoretical work Utilitarian benefits 
beyond low risk and high 
expected returns; social 
status 
Poor utilitarian and/or 
expressive benefits 
Chatterji 
et al. 
(2009) 
How well do KLD 
ratings inform about 
past and likely future 
environmental 
performance? 
Regression analysis 
(588 US firms) 
Theory-derived motive 
clusters: Good financial 
performance, ethical 
concerns, desire to 
punish/reward firms, 
social status 
Poor financial or 
ethical performance, 
rewarding/ punishing 
effectiveness, or effect 
on social status  
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Method 
In light of the research gaps, we chose an inductive, theory-building research approach rather 
than a deductive, theory-testing method. Our empirical data was gathered through semi-
structured face-to-face interviews with ten HNWIs. We followed an interview guide with open-
ended questions to obtain the subjects’ points of view in their own words (Kvale, 1996, 2007). 
Following an exploratory multi-case study approach we iteratively added empirical insights and 
through analytic induction moved toward concrete and empirically supported propositions 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2003). We will now outline our approach in more detail 
including the case selection, data collection and analysis. 
 
Case Selection 
Access to the secretive segment of HNWIs can be a challenge for scholars. HNWIs and their 
intermediaries commonly place a high value on confidentiality, given security concerns and the 
curiosity of colleagues, relatives, media, authorities and the public. This study accessed HNWIs 
through a Swiss private bank. In order to avoid selection bias the bank chosen for the interviewee 
solicitation is medium-sized in terms of assets under management and not branded as more or 
less ‘sustainable’ than others. The bank offers SI-products in the form of mutual funds, 
structured products and as a portfolio-management approach, on which the investment advisors 
have been trained alongside other traditional services and products. There is no (dis-) incentive 
to recommend one or the other product. The bank’s HNWI clients serve as our cases. The 
selection of cases that contribute substantially to the theory-building quality of the whole sample 
is essential to ensure the external validity and therefore the generalizability of findings (Yin, 
2003). Accordingly, our case selection process followed the concept of theoretical sampling, 
where, following each interview, we reflected on worthwhile questions and interviewee profiles 
to investigate in order to develop theoretical ideas (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). We obtained a list of 
potential cases through an interview request letter that was framed as a general investigation of 
interviewees’ investment interests and sent by the bank to its HNWI clients in Switzerland. We 
then conducted the interviews and iteratively developed the characteristics of our sample, as we 
obtained the most valuable insights in talking to polar types that are contrarily characterised by 
their high or low engagement in SI, investment knowledge and sustainability knowledge, as well 
as older or younger age versus the average age of HNWIs, 61 years (Fidelity Investments, 2012). 
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We stopped the data collection once additional theoretical insights gained through the interviews 
became small and a replication logic was secured (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Eisenhardt, 
1989; Yin, 2003). To ensure interviewees’ privacy we refer to cases as PRIV_01 to PRIV_12. 
PRIV_01A to PRIV_02B were test-interviews (round 1) with persons that were both HNWIs and 
private banking professionals, which served to triangulate, calibrate and refine our understanding 
of the topic as well as the interview guide. We then conducted interviews with ten HNWIs for 
data collection purposes, named PRIV_03 to PRIV_12 (round 2). Table 3 provides an overview 
of the interviewee profiles (the additional information relates to results and is discussed later). 
 
Table 3: Interviewee Profiles and Descriptives 
Inter-
viewee Sex Age 
Inv. time 
horizon 
(years or 
heirs, if 
focus) Occupation 
Invest-
ment 
know-
ledge 
SI 
know-
ledge 
SI practices 
applied  
SI in-
terest 
SI data 
source 
SI share 
in port-
folio 
Exclusio
ns ESGŦ 
Round 1: Initial interview guide development        
PRIV_01
A 
m 55 2-3 Private Banker > o n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
PRIV_01
B 
m ~65 No info Private Banker > o n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
PRIV_02
A 
m 65 3-5 Accountant > o n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
PRIV_02
B 
m ~45 No info Fund manager > o n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Round 2: Interview data gathering 
 
       
PRIV_03 m 60 20-30 Lawyer o o * * E O 7-8% 
PRIV_04 m 72 Heirs Consul general < <   L None None 
PRIV_05 m 61 20 Banking exec.  > > * * E O Some 
PRIV_06 m 83 Heirs Chemistry exec. > > * * E O 10% 
PRIV_07 m ~75 Heirs Energy exec. < o * * L None Some 
PRIV_08 m 63 1 Consulting exec. o o * * L None Low 
PRIV_09 m 63 Heirs Banking exec. o o * * E A 100% 
PRIV_10 f 68 Heirs Ballet teacher o o * * E A 100% 
PRIV_11 m 87 1 Engineer o o * * L A None 
PRIV_12 m 65 3-5 Lawyer, investor > o * * L None Low 
Note: Investment- / SI knowledge: ‘<’ = None; ‘o’ = Some; ‘>’ = Good level of knowledge 
relative to other interviewees 
 Ŧ: ‘ESG’ = environmental, social and governance factors considered in investment decisions 
SI-interest: ‘E’ = explicit; ‘L’ = latent interest in sustainable investing products and processes 
SI-data source: ‘A’ = client advisors; ‘O’ = other SI-data source, e.g. external SI-product 
vendors, media. 
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Data Collection  
We conducted semi-structured interviews following the process proposed by Kvale (2007) that 
allows subjects to freely share their perception and experience on a topic. We iteratively 
reviewed each interview for recurring patterns before the next interview was conducted in order 
to interpret findings and identify emerging theoretical ideas (Yin, 2003). As a result, the 
interview guide was updated four times, strengthening the internal and construct validity of our 
empirical work (Gibbert, Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008). Following the open questions included in the 
interview guide, the interviewee was first asked what general aspects he or she considers when 
setting up an investment portfolio, which elicited information on the individual family situation, 
investment knowledge, and investment time horizon. That was followed by a question on what 
trends or topics are considered as potential threats or opportunities, which elicited whether topics 
related to sustainability were part of the person’s thinking generally and as an investor. If the 
interviewee mentioned aspects related to sustainability, interviewers would inquire on the 
understanding of what sustainability is, and whether the person invests accordingly. That would 
elicit the understanding of and engagement in SI, and would be followed by a question on the 
motivation to invest in SI, data sources, and, lastly, perceived barriers to invest in SI. We asked 
about these aspects only when the interviewee did not mention them by herself. Thus, 
sustainability or SI was not defined by the interviewers, but by the interviewee through a 
discussion about financial investments in general. The goal was to avoid social desirability or 
framing effects. Three researchers conducted the interviews. One researcher attended all of the 
interviews, one attended the test-round and one the data collecting interviews.  
 
Data Analysis 
Following Gibbert et al. (2008), all of the one- to two-hour interviews were recorded and 
transcribed. The data analysis had two phases. In the first phase, the two researchers who had 
attended all the data collecting interviews went through the interview manuscripts and 
independently identified quotes that outlined characteristics of each case related to the polar type 
characteristics, the perception of sustainability and SI, and reasons to engage in SI. The results 
were discussed and matched together with the third researcher who had attended the test 
interviews. The process revealed a high interest in SI, different motivations and a high variety in 
investors’ perception of SI. In the second phase of the analysis, we applied the iterative and 
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systematic concept of analytical induction and specifically pattern matching to identify 
similarities and differences between cases, as well as to develop concrete and empirically 
supported propositions (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). The same two researchers independently 
went through the interview manuscripts again and highlighted aspects related to barriers in the 
involvement of interviewees in SI. The quotes were grouped under second and third-order codes 
and potential interrelations between barriers and other aspects were indicated. The three 
researchers compared the results and identified central patterns. The iterative, inductive process 
identified the three highly prevalent and dominant barriers that are outlined in the results section 
below. 
 
Results 
The results section presents interviewees’ interest in SI, their investment motives and topics that 
they relate to SI. Furthermore, we present insights related to the determinants of behaviour, 
including propositions for three dominant barriers and their integration into the proposed 
framework. 
 
HNWIs and SI: Interests, Motivations, and Topics 
We found that all of the interviewees were interested in SI. With the exception of one 
interviewee who delegates all investment decisions to his advisor, each person considered 
sustainability aspects by excluding certain industries and considering environmental, social or 
governance aspects in their investment decisions. That includes interviewees that openly disdain 
SI, as the following persons did: “PRIV_08: Sustainable investing is nothing but ‘hot air’”; or ” 
PRIV_12: Sustainable investing is a fashion-word, it is useless and a bad investment strategy. I 
have nothing against sustainable living and such, but as an investment concept it’s a sales 
argument.” Despite their severe commentary, both are engaged in SI. For example, the latter 
interviewee consciously excludes the tobacco industry from his direct investments and invests in 
renewable energy mutual funds. However, he was not aware of the fact that SI includes what he 
routinely engages in through his own investment approach. Similarly, one interviewee 
(PRIV_07) had never heard of SI, yet invested in renewable energy funds. Another person 
(PRIV_04) attentively reads corporate water reports, but does not know about the possibility to 
invest in funds or mandates that consider water aspects. Thus, some individuals may invest in SI, 
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or are interested in SI, but don’t know what SI is or what it entails. They can be categorized as 
‘latently’ interested in SI, versus those investors that know about SI and are ‘explicitly’ 
interested. The categorization of interviewees in these terms is provided in Table 3, together with 
their level of investment in SI, and an indication if the person excludes investments due to ethical 
reasons and if environmental, social or governance aspects are considered in investments. 
Notably, almost all interviewees consider SI aspects, and even ‘latently’ interested persons invest 
up to 10% of their portfolio along SI considerations. 
Further, the interviewees mentioned their motives to engage in SI. A mix of ethical and 
financial motives was brought forth by interviewees, for example: “PRIV_03: I don’t have 
British Tobacco in my portfolio anymore. Q.: For ethical reasons?; PRIV_03: No, due to 
smoking bans. […] I consider sustainable investing for diversification, profits and sympathy for a 
careful use of resources.” Ethical arguments were at the centre for two interviewees who were 
explicitly interested in SI and who invest 100% of their assets with financial objectives along SI 
criteria: “Q.: What percentage of your portfolio is invested along sustainability criteria [and 
why]? PRIV_09: Everything, except cash. […] We want to invest with a good conscience”; or 
“PRIV_10: I simply want to stand behind where I make money and where I don't." Overall, all 
interviewees mentioned mixed motives, yet ethics were more prominent than financial motives.  
The sustainability topics that our interviewees were interested in varied strongly among 
individuals. On the one hand, an interviewed consul general with experience on water projects in 
Africa (PRIV_04), for example, placed a focus on natural resources and specifically water topics, 
yet considers wind and solar energy as something “that doesn’t lead to much”, or “a disgrace 
for landscapes.” An energy executive (PRIV_07), on the other hand, put a strong focus on 
renewable energy, which he predicts to “have a great future.” Overall, the most prominent 
topics were natural resource scarcity, followed by the rise of renewable energy, corruption and a 
recession of ethics in business, the rise of energy efficiency technology, and climate change. 
Interviewees associated SI with thematic sustainability topics and specific industries, rather than, 
for example, microfinance or the consideration of environmental, social or governance aspects in 
security selection or portfolio construction. Thus, they focus on a small segment out of the much 
broader scope of SI. The specific topics that interviewees relate to SI varied widely and could 
often be traced to their professional background. 
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In sum, we find support for the existence of the SI gap: While many interviewees had 
little or no understanding of SI, we observe a high interest in considering sustainability aspects in 
their investment decisions. Even those interviewees that openly disdained SI do in fact invest in 
SI products and consider to some degree ethical or sustainability aspects in their investment 
decisions. We could thus infer that a large share of private investors is generally interested in SI; 
however, their actual engagement can still be fostered. Further, different individuals have 
different motivations to invest in SI, yet purely financial concerns appear rare or unlikely. That 
supports the case for SI given its financial and non-financial qualities. As such, a substantial 
potential may exist for more SI engagement depending on better information on SI and its 
versatility. Lastly, people relate different topics to SI. The high heterogeneity in individuals’ 
perceptions of SI and their motivations stresses the need to conceptually understand the decision-
making process in SI. Adding to these general insights, we now outline findings related to the 
determinants of behaviour to develop a more fine-grained decision-making framework. 
 
HNWIs’ Engagement in SI: A Decision-Making Framework 
Based on the SI-gap and our interviewees’ high interest in SI, we were particularly interested in 
understanding the decision-making process of private investors and the reasons why they refrain 
from being more engaged in SI. Thus, we outline our interview results along the determinants of 
behaviour of the proposed TPB framework adapted to SI as displayed in Figure 1. We focus on 
dominant barriers and propose their consideration in the framework displayed in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Theory of planned behaviour framework adapted to SI and extended based on 
interview results 
Note: The signs illustrate the proposed directionality of the relation, that is, (-) indicates a 
negative effect on the determinant 
 
Attitude towards the behaviour. As expected from the findings of East (1993), the interviewees 
frequently voiced opinions about the volatility of SI. Typical interviewee statements highlighted 
SI aspects as worthwhile, yet the financial performance of SI as overly volatile, as illustrated by 
the following statement: “PRIV_10: Sustainable firms will be the better investment in the long 
run. But most of them do not exist that long and are risky in the short term”. Most interviewees 
related SI to specific industries that are rather volatile, specifically to investments in small firms 
that are active in the renewable energy or water sector. A substantial impact of the perception of 
SI as overly volatile was identified when it appeared either in combination with individuals’ 
investment time horizon or with significant past financial losses, as detailed below.  
Research in the field of psychology emphasizes that the future time orientation of 
individuals affects their pro-environmental behavior (Milfont & Gouveia, 2006; Rabinovich, 
Morton, & Postmes, 2010). Similarly, organizational research has found that the compression of 
time – e.g., by discounting – can lead to an imbalance between business practices and the 
relatively slower underlying cycles of the natural environment (Bansal & Knox-Hayes, 2013). 
These insights about individuals’ time orientation help also understanding their financial 
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decision making with regard to SI. The individual’s investment time horizon ranged in our 
sample from one year to the consideration of following generations. We found clear evidence 
that the investment time horizon matters when individuals perceive SI to be volatile. When 
individuals have a long investment time horizon, their perception of SI to be volatile does not 
matter: "PRIV_06: The investments shall serve my children. […] Of course I've invested. Long 
term, as that [volatile water-] fund will do well in 20, 30 or 50 years. […] It’s an interesting 
topic for people that invest long-term, like me"; or "PRIV_07: I invest [in as volatile perceived 
renewable energy funds] and my heirs reap the benefits". In contrast, we identified a dominant 
cognitive barrier when individuals have a short investment time horizon and consider SI to be 
rather volatile. This can be illustrated by the following exemplary quotes: “PRIV_12: In my age 
now, I will be more critical [towards as volatile perceived SI]”; or “PRIV_11: I just see the 
stock-price drawdowns. To invest in solar would respond to my heart. […] [But] when I think 
about my [investment time horizon], it is rather short, based on my vintage.” This combination 
of short-termism and high perceived volatility of SI has a negative effect on attitude towards the 
behaviour (Figure 2). We summarize this in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: Private investors that associate SI with above-average volatility and have 
a short investment time horizon are less likely to invest in SI. 
 
Further, the interviews showed that general and rather recent financial losses such as from the 
‘global financial crisis’ beginning in 2008 combined with perceived high volatility matter as 
well. For example, one interviewee perceives SI as more volatile than average but aims to invest 
100% of her wealth in SI. Following general financial losses she shifted some assets into non-SI 
investments: “Q.: Has your investment behaviour changed due to the losses? PRIV_10: Yes, 
definitely. […] we have invested a bit in some big [non-SI] firms as well, something stable.” 
Similar reasoning for a low SI engagement was provided in the following statement by an 
interviewee who perceives SI as overly volatile: “PRIV_12: […] and it all went down a lot in 
2008. I don’t want to experience that again.” Contrary to that, interviewees who experienced 
losses yet did not regard SI as volatile showed an unchanged interest in SI (e.g., PRIV_06, 
PRIV_09). The recurrence of the pattern throughout the interviews and the direct impact on the 
individual engagement in SI points to a cognitive dominant barrier. Conceptualised in the context 
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of TPB, the perception of high volatility of SI in combination with financial losses has a negative 
effect on attitude towards the behaviour. The barrier is illustrated in Figure 2 and leads to the 
second proposition:  
 
Proposition 2: Private investors that associate SI with above-average volatility and have 
experienced general recent financial losses are less likely to invest in SI. 
 
Subjective norm. Our interviewees outlined that they discuss their investment decisions in 
private, with their wife or husband, and seldom with other family members or friends. Most 
active was an interviewee who stated the following: “PRIV_08: I call two or three experts before 
I take a new investment decision.” More common were responses that indicate a very small 
circle of people with whom investments are discussed: “Q.: Do you discuss your investments 
with someone else than your advisor? PRIV_05: Well, with acquaintances, I have two or three, 
but that comes and goes.” Others only mention the agreement of their partner: “PRIV_09: Every 
firm, in which we invest, must get the ok from my wife.” Some interviewees aim not to be 
involved in their investments and delegate as much as possible to their advisors, for example: 
“PRIV_04: We don’t really care for it. The bank knows what we are looking for, but we don’t get 
involved in the daily business. […] I trust the bank”; or “PRIV_07: It’s simply [name of client 
advisor] who I discuss with, and he recommends me this and that. […] And then I do what is 
recommended. I don’t know better.” Overall, we find that interviewees discuss their investments 
with a rather small group of people, and thus are rarely, if ever, exposed to peer pressure. 
Therefore, subjective norm might be less relevant in the context of private investors’ investment 
decisions than what could be expected from literature (e.g. Rosen et al., 1991; Statman, 2004). 
Since we cannot propose a specific dominant barrier in the context of subjective norm, we do not 
derive any corresponding implication for the decision-making framework. 
 
Perceived behavioural control. As for perceived limitations to the investment in SI, some clients 
did mention a lack of viable SI products, as illustrated in the following examples: “PRIV_03: I 
just don’t see the right [renewable energy] products”; or “Q.: Are there sectors where you 
would like to invest, but have not found SI products? PRIV_06: The things that I use every day. 
Like paper. I have worked with that as a chemist. Or the food industry. That will change a lot”; 
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or “PRIV_07: There are few [SI-] products. I mean climate change. What can you do there?” 
We infer that private investors appear to perceive a limited availability of products that relate to 
some specific topics of their interest. However, most interviewees were actually invested in SI 
products that – more or less – pertain to the topics of their main interests. Thus, we did not 
identify a dominant barrier that pertains to perceived behavioural control.  
 
Actual behavioural control. Prior research argued that actual behavioural control should not 
play a prominent role in investment decision-making (East, 1993). However, we found that the 
occurrence of actual limitations that investors could encounter following the formation of an 
intention to invest in SI could be important towards their actual behaviour of investing in SI. For 
example, the following interviewees explicitly sought to invest in SI yet received insufficient 
information from their advisors, information that was available to the advisors: “PRIV_11: If I 
knew a firm is involved in wrongdoings, such as disposing of waste into the sea or Africa, then I 
would probably divest from that firm. Q: Do you have that information? PRIV_11: I do not have 
that information”; or “Q.: Has your advisor brought SI forward to you? PRIV_03: No. He thinks 
I have enough sources […] and that I get these monthly reports from [name of bank].” Others 
received SI information, yet still lack SI advice that they can implement, as illustrated here: “Q.: 
After you voiced your interest, have you received information on SI products from your advisor? 
PRIV_11: I received some information on SI. But I don’t know how to act on it now.” 
In sum, we found a dominant barrier in advisors who appear to withhold SI information 
from their clients. This barrier was found despite the fact that all of the HNWIs’ advisors were 
trained on SI and were encouraged to advise their clients accordingly. Reasons for the hesitant 
behaviour could include advisors’ concern or fear of the high heterogeneity in clients’ view of 
SI. In the decision-making framework (Figure 2) we conceptualise this barrier accordingly: 
advisors reduce actual behaviour control, i.e. their clients’ ability to act upon their intention to 
invest in SI. Accordingly, this is reflected by the last proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: While private investors may have the intention to invest in SI, the ability 
to invest in SI is restricted by investment advisors that withhold relevant SI-information. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Potential Explanations for the SI Gap 
Our results offer new explanations for the observed SI gap. While we find a high interest of 
HNWIs in SI, our results highlight important barriers in the decision-making process that keep 
private investors from engaging in SI.  
Barrier one pertains to a combination of the perception of SI as volatile together with a 
short investment time horizon; barrier two describes the perception of high volatility of SI 
together with financial losses. Both combinations appear to have a direct negative effect on the 
person’s attitude towards investing in SI, which predicts the formation of the intention to invest 
in SI.  
These barriers could be of significant relevance for explaining the SI gap: First, the 
cognitive barrier stemming from volatility and short-termism could inherently affect many older 
people – such as, for example, many representatives of the highly economically relevant segment 
of HNWIs. With an average age of over 60 years this segment is relatively old (Fidelity 
Investments, 2012) and, thus, may have a tendency towards a shorter investment time horizon. 
Second, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, it is very likely that many private investors 
experienced financial losses. Thus, the cognitive barrier related to volatility and recent losses 
could apply to many private investors.  
Finally, the third barrier – that advisors withhold SI information – comes into effect once 
a private investor has formed the intention to invest in SI. Sufficient information on how to act 
upon that intention is a prerequisite for the actual behaviour of investing in SI. Thus, SI 
information being withheld is a direct and – given the far-reaching reliance on investment 
advisors – a potentially rather powerful contributor to the SI gap.  
 
Contributions to the Organization and Environment literature  
To our knowledge, this is the first assessment of dominant barriers in the decision-making 
process towards SI engagement, as well as of combinations of aspects that form such dominant 
barriers. This study contributes conceptually through a framework of the decision-making 
process of private investors in SI, providing detailed empirical insights on the determinants of 
behaviour as proposed by the theory of planned behaviour.  
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As one key result, we find that while most HNWIs consider SI as rather volatile, they 
differ in the length of their investment time horizon; those HNWIs with a longer investment time 
horizon are more likely to engage in SI. This insight adds to the perspective that the 
consideration of time in management research is important for understanding the conditions for 
sustainable development (Gladwin, Kennelly, & Krause, 1995). Bansal and Knox-Hayes (2013) 
argue that time is being compressed by organisations; this becomes obvious through financial 
instruments such as futures and derivatives. The resulting short-termism stands in conflict with 
the relatively slower underlying cycles of the natural environment. We observed this conflict in 
our interviews. Some interviewees were generally interested in considering ecological aspects 
within their investment decisions but their investment time horizon dominated this initial 
intention: investments that are aligned with natural environment considerations took too long for 
them to materialize. Others accepted a long investment time horizon and engaged in SI.  
Beyond HNWIs, the effect of time on the engagement in SI has been observed for other 
types of investors as well. One example are Venture Capital (VC) firms. VCs typically raise 
large sums of capital and invest in promising start-ups that they nurture until they can be sold for 
a large profit. Similarly to our observation that those HNWIs with a long investment time 
horizon were more likely to engage in SI, Marcus and colleagues indicate that VC firms that 
engage in investments related to sustainability are “stretching out their timetables” (Marcus, 
Malen, & Ellis, 2013, p. 31). While we can identify this similarity between long-term oriented 
HNWIs and VCs they differ in one specific aspect that also matters in SI: VCs typically are not 
willing to sacrifice financial returns for ethical or other non-financial benefits; for HNWIs this 
depends on the individual preferences. In sum, our findings add a piece to the puzzle of barriers 
and motivations for SI: for the economically highly relevant investor type of wealthy private 
investors there is no unequivocal picture; there are many individual aspects and differing 
perceptions that determine their SI engagement. This, in turn, implies that there is a huge 
potential for unleashing the powerful few and moving towards closing the SI gap. 
Our findings on the important role of advisors in individual investors´ engagement in SI 
add detailed empirical evidence to prior suggestions on that topic in the SI literature (Hummels 
& Timmer, 2004; Nilsson, 2010). From the work of Schrader (2006), we know that advisors that 
withhold SI information are potential barriers for less wealthy retail investors. Schrader points to 
the logic that advisors of wealthy clients might have a better knowledge of SI and inform their 
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clients accordingly, yet we show that even some HNWI advisors who have been trained on SI 
withhold that information. Thus, we add to literature with the notion that hesitant advisors might 
be an important SI barrier for private investors overall, both retail and HNWI. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
In terms of the limitations of this exploratory study, the geographical focus and limited size of 
our sample have to be considered. We encourage future research to extend our results and to test 
and specify the impact and relevance of our propositions and the TPB framework adapted to SI. 
Comparisons of different types of investors or markets may provide valuable additional insights. 
In terms of generalizability, we suggest that studying HNWIs, on the one hand, imposes 
limitations due to their privileged access to investment solutions and advice; on the other hand, 
the lack of these privileges by retail investors means that some of the barriers that HNWIs face 
might be encountered by ordinary retail investors as well, if not even to a larger extent.  
Our findings call for further research that links SI with behavioural economics. 
Combining individual´s time orientation with volatility perception and financial losses offers a 
bridge from SI engagement to prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). For example, the 
myopic loss aversion concept (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995) explains why people invest more in 
securities that they perceive as volatile if they reduce the frequency with which they evaluate the 
investment’s financial performance, or consider a longer investment time horizon. Applied in the 
context of SI, the concept could show that investors who consider SI as overly volatile might 
have a more positive attitude to SI not only if they consider a longer investment time horizon, as 
suggested in our study, but also if they reduce the frequency of evaluating the financial 
performance of their investments. Future research might find that the frequency with which 
performance is reported is fixed by bank operations or regulation, maybe to the detriment of 
privates’ engagement in SI. Likewise, the house money effect concept (Thaler & Johnson, 1990) 
shows that investors are more risk-seeking following a gain compared to a situation after a 
financial loss. Applied to SI, the concept could provide a theoretical foundation to assess the 
effect of volatility not only with losses, as outlined in our study, but also with financial gains.  
Further, our observation that investors state that they have the general intention to invest 
in SI, but they did not invest in SI due to short-term financial concerns, points to the want/should 
distinction of Bazerman et al. (1998). The framework pertains to similar conflicts between what 
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people want to do versus what they think they should do. An assessment of the want/should 
distinction in the context of SI and the TPB framework might, for example, identify a 
moderating effect of the want/should distinction between intention and behaviour. Lastly, 
advisors’ neglect for SI is surprising since the general benefit of their work for clients is 
increasingly challenged (Hackethal, Haliassos, & Jappelli, 2012). Here, providing detailed SI 
related information might be an opportunity to add new value to their advisory services. For 
scholars it would be of interest to investigate why advisors do not provide this information, i.e. 
what are the perceptions, frames, barriers, and motivational aspects that determine the advisors’ 
engagement in discussing SI with private investors.  
 
Implications for Practitioners 
Our results reveal insights about investors´ behaviour that are vital for practitioners when 
promoting SI funds and investment products (Dunfee, 2003). Our results regarding HNWIs’ high 
interest in SI point to a substantial market opportunity for SI. However, due to differing investor 
preferences, a ‘one size fits all’ strategy in product development and placement is not advisable. 
Private investors have different motivations to invest in SI. These motivations range from 
considering investment approaches that only exclude certain industries to holistic approaches 
that encompass a full range of different environmental, social, and governance criteria.  
This is an important finding for practitioners who seek to balance the way products are 
tailored to the interest of clients and attract substantial amounts of assets. Similarly, practitioners 
might consider clients’ investment time horizon or history of financial losses for the strategic 
positioning of SI offerings. For example, clients that experienced losses may be interested in 
more conservative SI approaches that seek to reduce risks by considering environmental, social 
and governance factors. More volatile renewable energy investments could attract investors with 
a long investment time horizon. However, one requirement is that they have not experienced 
recent financial losses.  
Finally, practitioners might consider our finding on advisors as a critical roadblock in the 
development and distribution of SI offerings. It appears important to train and motivate advisors 
to inform clients about SI and to be prepared to adequately respond to their clients’ 
heterogeneous understanding of SI. Overall, this study shows that the general availability of 
information about SI, the individual perception of SI, and specific characteristics of investor 
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types are of importance for SI engagement. These aspects determine the decision-making process 
in SI and go beyond the usual “does it pay to be green” debate that so far dominated the 
discussion in academic and practitioner literature. 
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